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Résumé 
La r é c e n t e v a g u e d é m o c r a t i q u e en A f r i q u e qu i a déf ié 
l e s d i c t a t u r e s m i l i t a i r e s , u n i p a r t i t e s e t p e r s o n n e l l e s 
a é té c o n f r o n t é e à d ' é n o r m e s o b s t a c l e s . M a l g r é u n 
s o u l a - g e m e n t c e r t a i n l ié à la l i b é r a t i o n d e la s o c i é t é 
c i v i l e d e s a s u f f o c a t i o n t r a d i t i o n n e l l e , l e 
d é v e l o p p e m e n t d e s n o u v e a u x m o u v e m e n t s e t d e s 
p a r t i s p o l i t i q u e s a é té f re iné p a r u n e v i s ion l i m i t é e , 
u n a s s e r v i s s e m e n t e x - c e s s i f à d e s p r o g r a m m e s 
é c o n o m i q u e s e t p o l i t i q u e s c o n t r ô l é s p a r d e s 
é t r a n g e r s , l ' o p p o r t u n i s m e , l ' é l i t i s m e , la c o r r u p t i o n , 
la d é p e n d a n c e v i s - à - v i s de l o y a u t é s p r i m o r d i a l e s , la 
m a r g i n a l i s a t i o n d e s f e m m e s et d e s p e r s o n n e s i s s u e s 
d e m i l i e u x r u r a u x , a ins i q u e p a r l ' i n c a p a c i t é d e ces 
n o u v e a u x m o u v e m e n t s e t p a r t i s p o l i t i q u e s à s e 
d i f f é r e n c i e r d e s r é g i m e s d i s c r é d i t é s d a n s le p a s s é . 
E n Z a m b i e , l a v i c t o i r e é p o u s t o u f f l a n t e d u 
M o u v e m e n t p o u r la D é m o c r a t i e M u l t i p a r t i ( M M D ) 
en 1 9 9 1 n e s 'es t p a s t r a d u i t e p a r u n e a m é l i o r a t i o n 
s i g n i f i c a t i v e d e s c o n d i t i o n s d e v ie du p e u p l e . A y a n t 
a m p l e m e n t é l a r g i l a s p h è r e p o l i t i q u e , l e 
g o u v e r n e m e n t M M D d e m e u r e t o u t e f o i s n o n 
s e u l e m e n t c o n s e r v a t e u r , m a i s é g a l e m e n t i n c a p a b l e 
d ' é t a b l i r u n o r d r e v é r i - t a b l e m e n t t r a n s p a r e n t , 
r e s p o n s a b l e , m o r a l et p o l i t i q u e . Le M M D s 'es t vu 
c o n f r o n t é à d e s d i f f i c u l t é s d a n s s e s p o l i t i q u e s 
e t h n i q u e e t r é g i o n a l e e t a é t é a f fa ib l i p a r p l u s i e u r s 
s c a n d a l e s . L ' a v e n i r d e la d é m o c r a t i e en Z a m b i e 
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d é p e n d du d e g r é d e c o n s o l i d a t i o n de la l i b é r a l i s a t i o n , 
de la v é r i t a b l e d é m o c r a t i s a t i o n d u s y s t è m e p o l i t i q u e , 
d e la m o b i l i s a t i o n d u p e u p l e , d e l e u r s c o m m u n a u t é s 
et d ' o r g a n i s a t i o n s , a i n s i q u e d e l e u r p a r t a g e d u 
p o u v o i r , d u d é m a n t è l e m e n t d e l ' E t a t n é o - c o l o n i a l 
r é p r e s s i f e t d e la c o n s t r u c t i o n d ' u n E t a t n a t i o n a l 
p o p u l a i r e . 
The past few years have witnessed a democratic awakening in 
many parts of Africa. It is one thing for democratic regimes to 
emerge, quite another for democracy to flourish and endure. The 
latter can only happen if democratic change is effected and 
institutions established that actually function as guardians of the 
democratic process and of the people1. 
People think that once you have got a democracy, everything is 
going to be free of charge. The danger is impatience2. 
The final outcome of these on-going processes of democratic 
transition in Africa is uncertain at best, and experts' analyses and 
predictions range from guarded optimism to frank 
pessimism....Any effort to superimpose a specific narrow 
formula of democracy could lead to mere formal compliance, 
such as allowing multipartism without "real democracy3." 
1
. RASHEED SADIG, "Africa at the Doorstep of the Twenty-First Century: Can 
Crisis Turn to Opportunity" in Adebayo Adedeji, (ed.), Africa Within the World: 
Beyond Dispossession and Dependence, London and Ijebu-Ode: Zed Books and 
ACDESS, 1993, p. 47. 
2
. SOGLO NICEPHORE, President of Benin quoted in Jeune Afrique,1632, 16-22 
April 1992. 
3. MARTIN GUY, "Preface: Democratic Transition in Africa," Issue: A Journal of 
Opinion Vol. XXI,(l-2), 1993, pp. 6 and 7. 
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The recent wave of democratic openings and struggles in 
Africa has challenged not just one-party political systems and 
personal rule, but also military dictatorships, pseudo-
democracies, and the general suffocation of civil society. With the 
on-going changes in the global order and the gradual 
recomposition of socio-economic and political relations, Africa 
has not been left out of the political, if not the economic wave. 
Yet, while the military has civilianized itself in Ghana, life-
presidents have given way to the popular will in Malawi, 
apartheid has been more or less dismantled in South Africa, and 
communist governments have crumbled in Benin and Ethiopia, 
the major challenge confronting these courageous efforts at 
political renewal has been the consolidation of democracy. Many 
of the new political parties and prodemocracy movements 
received financial, ideological, and other logistical support from 
donors, lenders, Western governments and other foreign 
agencies. Some did succeed in mobilizing internal opposition in 
the struggle to challenge dictatorship and authoritarianism. Yet, 
the ground-swell of support received at the initial stages have not 
translated into consistent, predictable, or permanent support in the 
post-election periods4. As Denis Venter has noted in the case of 
Malawi, the "liberation dividend" has not followed the truly 
political earthquake which saw the defeat of Kamuzu Banda, one 
of the continents most infamous dictators: "The restoration of aid 
promised by donors on condition of the successful completion of 
the democratization process has yet to materialize in any 
significant way. 5" 
To be sure, the political changes in the continent are 
precipitates of a complex set on internal and external factors and 
developments. Though in large measure a manifestation of the 
4.GOLDSMITH ARTHUR A., "Political Freedom and the Business Climate: 
Outlook for Development in Newly Democratizing States," Social Science 
Quarterlv Vol. 75, (1), March 1994, p.l15. 
5. VENTER DENIS, "Malawi: the Transition to Multi-Party Politics," in 
WISEMAN JOHN, (ed.), Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa 
London: Routledge: 1995, p.180. 
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continuing struggles against the betrayal of the early years of 
political independence when the nationalists appropriated the 
powers and privileges of the departing colonial powers, more 
recent events have also propelled the calls for political renewal. 
The delegitimization of the repressive and non-hegemonic neo-
colonial state; the unbridled corruption and irresponsibility of the 
dominant classes; the decay of infrastructures and basic services; 
widespread corruption, mismanagement, and the marginalization 
of the people from decision-making processes; the suffocation of 
civil society and the closures of all outlets for independent 
political expression; the emergence of new political leaders, 
political movements, and interest groups making open demands 
for political pluralism; and the unequal distribution of the costs 
and pains of World Bank and IMF dictated and directed structural 
adjustment programs. On the external front we can identify the 
events in Eastern Europe, the end of the cold war and the near 
irrelevance of old allies of the ideological blocs, the new emphasis 
on political pluralism, good governance, accountability, and 
respect for human rights by donors, lenders, and creditors; 
pressures from debt and debt-servicing obligations; the drastic 
reductions in foreign aid, foreign investment and foreign interest 
in most African economies; and impact of the new globalization 
which required extensive political, social and economic 
restructuring. 
African leaders have responded to these developments in 
a variety of ways: the national conference, open competitive 
elections, guided liberalization, opposition to pluralism, attempts 
to divide the opposition through bribery and/or the registration of 
scores of opposition parties, co-optation, and intimidation. 
Irrespective of the adopted strategy, the new political movements 
have succeeded in compelling military dictators to accept political 
pluralism (Benin, Babangida's Nigeria, and Ghana); one-party 
regimes to allow for more parties (Kenya and Zambia); and one-
person life-presidential systems to adopt multiparty political 
systems (Malawi). The national conference has been more of a 
Francophone phenomena which has been utilized in Benin, 
Congo, Mali, Gabon, and Niger. 
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Though it is true that "democracy is spreading like 
bushfire throughout Africa,"6 at least until recently, the new pro-
democracy movements and political parties have tended to exhibit 
some common traits: corruption, opportunism, the 
marginalization of women, concentration in specific regions or 
urban centers, personalization of politics, confusion, 
fragmentation, excessive ambition and focus on power, and an 
unabashed acceptance and consumption of conservative, 
monetarist programs of the IMF and World Bank. The 
movements and new parties operate and sound very much like the 
parties of the 1960s, they develop no new arguments and 
programs beyond a superficial clamor for democracy, they hardly 
cultivate new constituencies and communities, and without 
exception, they seek to validate their democratic credentials, not 
by critically inserting themselves in local communities and 
organizations, but by courting foreign foundations, agencies, 
governments, and donors. This is not to discountenance the great 
risks they have taken in challenging regimes and leaders with long 
standing reputations for intolerance, brutality, and human rights 
abuses. The superficial, defensively radical, opportunistic, 
diversionary, and narrow focus of the organizations, politics, and 
strategies have eroded their legitimacy, bred confusion, and made 
it easy for the incumbent governments to penetrate, divide, and 
out-manoeuver them in the competition for power7. 
Finally, the process of political liberalization in Africa 
has, in spite of widespread expectations, failed to bring about 
fundamental changes. It was expected that the political upheavals 
and the political rhetoric of the new political leaders would 
heighten expectations among hitherto exploited, marginalized, 
oppressed, and intimidated communities and persons. Promises 
were made about food, water, shelter, health care, better roads, 
6. MARTIN GUY, "Preface: Democratic Transition in Africa," op. cit., p. 6. 
7
. See IHONVBERE JULIUS 0, On the Threshold of Another False Start?: A 
Critical Evaluation of Prodemocracy Movements in Africa, paper presented a the 
11th Annual Meeting of the Council of Nigerian People and Organizations 
(CONPO), Washington, D.C., September 14-17, 1995. 
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power supply, good schools, loans to farmers, better wages, 
inflation control, the termination of crime and prostitution, open 
governance, accountability, respect for human rights, and the 
involvement of the people in the political processes and in 
decision-making. In short, the people were promised a better life. 
This has not happened in any country. In Nigeria, the process 
culminated in a military coup in November 1993 bringing to 
power one of the most insensitive and ruthless military junta in 
that nation's political history. In Kenya, "political paralysis, high 
rates of inflation, and insecurity have become the order of the day 
since the Moi government stole an election in December 19928." 
Denis Venter points out that "Malawi has shown that democracy 
can cure some ills but may worse others 9." The removal of 
Banda's despotism has unleashed a corrupt and careless press, 
"unprecedented urban crime...a generally deteriorating security 
situation,...marked increase in, especially, crimes of violence," 
and worsening economic crisis 1 0. Finally, Harvey Glickman 
notes that in spite of democratic openings all over the continent, 
governments "are still unable to arrest economic decline," and 
while liberalization has certainly meant "more freedom," it has 
also meant "more strife11." This failure has affected the credibility 
and legitimacy of the new democratic governments. Deepening 
economic and social crisis, inability to meet the needs of the 
people, and the general picture of confusion, indecision, and 
inexperience in many instances have culminated in coups or 
attempted coups, mass withdrawal of support for new 
governments, the emergence of scores of opposition parties, 
harsh media attacks on the governments, and the return of the 
8. MAKAU WA MUTUA, "U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Africa," in William 
Minter, (ed.), U.S. Forei~n Policv: An Africa A~enda, Washington, D.C.: Africa 
Policy Information Center, 1995, p. 16. 
9. VENTER DENIS, "Malawi: The Transition to Multi-Party Politics," op. cit., p. 
178. 
10. ibid, p. 181. 
11. GLICKMAN HARVEY, "Editor's Introduction," Issue: A Journal of Opinion 
Vol. XXI, (1-2),1993, p.3. 
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people to ethnic, regional, religious, and patron-client bases of 
survival. 
It is the inability of the new regimes to contain political 
fragmentation, genuinely open up civil society, present a viable 
agenda for economic and social recovery, and mobilize the people 
for self-reliance that has generated the new pessimism about 
political liberalization in Africa. Adebayo Adedeji captures well 
this new frustration with the democratization process when he 
notes that "this process has been largely aborted and subverted, 
the very subversion in some cases master-minded by the very 
leaders who had proclaimed their commitment to the realization of 
democracy. Indeed, the past...years have witnessed oscillations 
between tumult and paralysis, and have shown more clearly than 
ever before the deep-rooted and systemic weaknesses of current 
leadership in Africa12." In a more recent address Adedeji noted 
that "the idea of a second liberalization in Africa has gone away 
with the wind, at least temporarily. Even the most timid attempts 
at democratization have often failed due to self-centeredness of 
African leaders and their lack of vision1 3." It is becoming clear, as 
a respondent put it in Lusaka, that "the defeat of dictators is much 
easier than replacing the dictators. Building true democracy is 
more of a challenge. So far, we are not having much luck in 
Zambia because of overwhelming problems 1 4" How has Zambia 
fared with its new liberalization since the 1991 elections which 
saw the routing of the 27-year government of Kenneth Kaunda 
and the United National Independence Party (UNIP)? Has the 
emergence of the Frederick Chiluba-led Movement for Multi-
Party Democracy (MMD) led to the genuine movement from 
1 2
. ADEDEJI ADEBAYO, "The Case for Remaking Africa," in RIMMER 
DOUGLAS, (ed.), Action in Africa London: James Currey and Heinemann, 1993, 
p. 44. 
1 3 
13. ADEDEJI ADEBAYO, Keynote Address at the conference on "An African 
Agenda for Economic and Social Transformation in the New Global Environment, 
Lincoln University. November 17-18, 1994. 
14 
14. Interview with an MMD Member of Parliament, Hon. Samuel Miyanda, 
Lusaka, June 1993. 
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democracy to democratization, the mobilization of the people, and 
the consolidation of the new democratic enterprise? 
The Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Africa 
It is important to distinguish between political 
liberalization and democratization especially in the African 
context15. Liberalization is quite possible without democratization. 
The former simply involves the establishment of a more open 
political order, the dismantling of the institutions and constraints 
of dictatorship, and the reduction, not necessarily elimination, of 
controls, human rights abuses, and restrictions of personal and 
collective liberties16 . The transition from political liberalization to 
democratization is often mediated by a range of problems: the 
legacy of the defeated dictator along with inherited institutions and 
structures; contending constituencies; primordial loyalties; 
factions within the military; economic deterioration and decay; 
institutional inefficiency and ineffectiveness' gross inequality in 
power, opportunities, amenities, and income; alienation from the 
state arising from earlier conditions of human rights abuses and 
marginalization; and the need to meet overblown expectations. 
What has been going on in virtually all African states, is political 
liberalization, evidenced in a concentration on procedural 
15. See LEMARCHAND RENE, "African Transitions to Democracy: An Interim 
(and Mostly Pessimistic) Assessment," Africa Insight Vol. 22, (3) 1992; 
HEALEY J AND ROBINSON M , "Democracy. Governance and Economic" Policv: 
Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective, London: Overseas Development 
Institute, 1992; and PINKNEY ROBERT, Democracvyin the Third World, Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner, 1994. 
16. According to HEALEY and ROBINSON, political liberalization involves a 
situation "in which the fear of repression is relaxed and there are constitutional 
guarantees of a range of political freedoms (especially the recognition of the right 
of opposition groupings to function and to express dissent) in which there is 
greater independence for legislative assemblies where they still exist, and 
freedom of the press." See HEALEY J AND ROBINSON M., "Democracy. 
Governance and Economic Policy" op. cit., p. 151. 
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democracy. This process tends to focus on the creation of 
multiparties, constitutional engineering, campaigns, the 
constitutional guarantee of basic freedoms, and periodic elections. 
While these are certainly important, unless the process goes 
significantly beyond elections, it is quite easy to domesticate or 
contain the process, or to terminate it as was the case in Nigeria. 
To be sure, even the mere liberalization of the political landscape 
allows for the establishment and operation of opposition parties, 
the articulation of alternative political programs, the training of 
new leaders, and provides opportunities for deepening local 
politics beyond established levels. However, if it does not build a 
genuinely democratization project into the process, initial victories 
by popular forces can end up in disaster, further alienating the 
people, and generating what Samuel Huntington rightly calls 
"authoritarian nostalgia": where the bad old days suddenly look 
so rosy and much better! 1 7 Huntington points out that 
"authoritarian nostalgia could conceivably pave the way for the 
"slow death" of a democratic regime, with the military or other 
authoritarian forces resuming power 1 8." It is in this context that 
we can better appreciate the rising popularity of Kenneth Kaunda 
in Zambia and the way in which this development has scared the 
Chiluba government into all sorts of desperate political moves 
(see below). 
Democratization involves the steady and systematic 
empowerment of the people, their organization, and communities 
in a direction which empowers them to dictate, influence, and 
determine the content and context of politics. Democratization 
allows the people to incorporate their interests in the institutions 
and structures of the state, and this makes it possible for public 
policy to reflect the interests and aspirations of the people. 
Finally, democratization makes it possible for politics to reflect 
the issues close to the people: gender equality, human rights, 
1 7
. HUNTINGTON SAMUEL P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Centurvy Norman: Oklahoma University Press 1991) p. 262. 
18 . ibid 
9 1 
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environmental protection, basic needs, participation in decision-
making, accountability of the leadership, expansion of democratic 
spaces, and the non-appropriation of the voices of the people. An 
agenda for democratization makes it possible for democracy to be 
consolidated largely because it develops and nurtures an 
environment for collective contribution to projects, collective 
acknowledgment of problems, and collective acceptance of 
mistakes. The nature and politics of the contemporary political 
parties and movements have provided ample opportunities for 
skepticism about the future of democracy, much less, the 
consolidation of democracy in Africa: 
...it seems highly likely that third wave 
democratic regimes will not handle these problems 
effectively and that they will, in all probability, be 
no more or less successful in doing this than their 
authoritarian predecessors. Insurgencies, inflation, 
poverty, debt, inequality, and/or bloated 
bureaucracies will continue more or less as they 
have in previous decades 1 9. 
In Zambia, the liberalization agenda, and the new 
democratic government of the MMD has been tasked by the very 
problems outlined above. As a Movement, government, and 
political party, the MMD has had to contend with problems of 
legitimacy, the intransigence of the defeated authoritarian regime, 
strong opposition from UNIP stalwarts and leaders, worsening 
economic crisis, scores of strikes and protests by workers, 
students and peasants; ethnic and communal conflicts, regional 
challenges to central authority, severe socio-economic inequality, 
and the constraining effects of debt and debt-servicing 
obligations. Zambia is, today, paying very dearly for almost three 
decades of despotism, corruption, waste, mismanagement, 
92 
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sectoral distortion, and ideological experimentation2 0. According 
to Jowie Mwiinga, "Increasingly, Zambians are beginning to feel 
they have been short-changed by the Chiluba establishment. Most 
are now beginning to regard the Kaunda years with nostalgia2 1." 
It will be an exaggeration to contend that life has improved for the 
average Zambian in spite of the promises and efforts of the MMD. 
As Lance Morrow noted recently, "Zambia has become one of the 
poorest nations anywhere, with one of the world's highest per 
capita foreign debts- nearly $1000 for each of its 8 million people; 
average annual income per person is less than $290...."2 2 These 
developments and conditions certainly do not augur well for the 
survival of liberal democratic institutions much less genuine 
democratization23. 
The 1991 General Elections in Zambia 
The UNIP and Kenneth Kaunda was certain that they 
would win the 1991 elections. In spite of the massive following 
which the MMD enjoyed, and in spite of the international 
goodwill in its favor, the UNIP was certain that it could 
successfully rely on rural interests and the power of incumbency 
to win the elections. The process leading to the 1991 general 
elections was rough and full of conflicting and complex 
developments, accusations and counter-accusations, efforts to 
manipulate the state and its resources, appeals to the masses for 
20. See ibid, pp. 252-255. 
2 1
. MWIINGA JOWIE, "Chill for Chiluba," Africa Report, March-April, 1994, p. 
60 . 
22. ibid. 
23. See IHONVBERE JULIUS O.. Economic Crisis. Democratization and Civil 
Society in Zambia Forthcoming Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996. 
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support, and some violence 2 4. Both parties relied on patronage 
politics by giving out gifts, making outlandish promises, courting 
particular constituencies, and trying to exploit existing frustrations 
and fears. The UNIP and the MMD also relied on the 
manipulation of the pains and expectations of the Zambian people. 
While the UNIP relied on traditional institutions and hoped to win 
the support of rural dwellers, the MMD relied on support from the 
urban areas and on reaping gains arising from the low popularity 
of Kaunda and UNIP as a result of economic problems. The 
UNIP was shocked to discover that rural dwellers were already 
feeling the pains of the party's failed economic programs. The 
MMD relied on the extensive and effective networks of the 
Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which Chiluba, the 
MMD flag bearer had led for almost two decades. It also relied on 
the churches across the nation to mobilize its supporters. Though 
the UNIP tried to exploit the power of incumbency and its control 
over the media, it could not convince the majority of Zambians 
that it had any new ideas for dealing with the mounting economic 
problems and reviving the economy. At the October elections, the 
UNIP was roundly defeated, winning only 25 of the 150 seats in 
parliament, and losing the presidency to the MMD 2 5 . Zambians 
were so fed up with the UNIP and Kaunda that very few took 
notice of the MMD's promise to stick more stringently to IMF and 
World Bank adjustment programs. Very few paid attention to the 
fact that the leading cadres of the MMD were actually persons 
who had served Kaunda very well in the UNIP and had been 
dismissed for one offence or the other. Most Zambians took little 
notice of the political and public record of the MMD leadership 
and bothered to discuss what impact this would have on the party 
once it came to power. No one bothered to ask how the MMD 
JOSEPH RICHARD, "Zambia: A Model for Democratic Change," Current 
Historv, May 1992) p. 200. See also his "Africa: Rebirth of Political Freedom," 
Journal of Democracv Vol. 2, (4), Fall 1991. 
25. See BRATTON MICHAEL, "Economic Crisis and Political Realignment in 
Zambia," in WIDNER JENNIFER, (ed.), Economic Change and Political 
Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994. 
9 4 
JO.Ihonvbere: The crisis of democratic consolidation in Zambia 
planned to covert itself from a Movement (made up of differing, 
even conflicting interests) into a government in post-UNIP 
Zambia. Finally, the MMD never placed before the Zambian 
people how it planned to challenge, recompose, and redefine the 
philosophical basis of politics and power in Zambia, as well as 
how it would wean the institutions and structures of state and 
society away from the authoritarian legacies of the UNIP. 
The MMD in Power 1991-1995: Still No Recovery in 
Sight 
When the MMD came to power in 1991, its victory was 
greeted by analysts and Western governments as a shining 
example to other African states. The smooth transition from 
Kaunda's authoritarian one-party system to a liberal multiparty 
political arrangement was seen as an encouraging sign that 
democracy would not only thrive in Zambia, but also that it would 
facilitate economic growth and recovery. Chiluba's trade union 
background, the broad consensus of interests which the MMD 
represented, and its open commitment to structural adjustment 
were seen as very positive factors which would support the 
democratic enterprise. Furthermore, its comfortable majority in 
Parliament was seen as advantageous in that it would remove 
stalemate, delays, and unnecessary disagreements over programs 
required to promote economic recovery and the consolidation of 
democracy. Of course, the massive support which the MMD had 
enjoyed from foreign interests also gave the impression that 
foreign aid would flow into the country, investors would be re-
attracted, debt concessions would reduce debt-servicing 
obligations, and the new democratic government would 
distinguish itself through its ability to improve the terrible living 
conditions of the poor majority. For the teeming supporters of the 
MMD, the "Hour" for their liberation from poverty, intimidation, 
and marginalization had truly come. 
Unfortunately, things have not worked out quite well for 
the MMD in Zambia. Even the government agrees that it has failed 
9 5 
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to live up to expectations though it frequently blames these 
failures on the UNIP legacy, the global environment, lack of 
foreign aid and investments, and the low spirituality of Zambians. 
The National Commission for Development Planning noted in its 
1992 report that the "prospects for employment in 1993 are not 
very promising due to envisaged loss of jobs because of factors 
such as: privatization; retrenchment in the public sector; continued 
credit squeeze which is likely to restrict investments; and 
measures to control inflation are likely to cause a contraction in 
the economy and hence inhibit expansion in employment 2 6." Its 
1993 and 1994 reports were no different. In virtually every 
sector, the results of the MMD's reform programs were 
disappointing. Emmanuel Kasonde, as finance minister made it 
clear to Parliament in his 1993 budget address that in spite of the 
NERP and support from donors and lenders, "some major 
challenges remain. Our main problem is inflation. Unless we 
drastically reduce the rate of inflation, the economy will not 
stabilise, confidence will not return, investment will remain 
depressed, and we will fail in our attempt to regenerate economic 
growth 2 7." 
For 1993, the primary objective of government recovery 
programs focused on tighter fiscal policies; reduction in domestic 
borrowing by government and the parastatals; bringing inflation 
down to 10 percent; abolishing supplementary appropriations to 
government ministries; repaying much of government outstanding 
debt to the banking system; freeing up resources for private sector 
expansion, and running the government on a cash basis. The 
Bank of Zambia was instructed to "deny any government 
transaction unless there are adequate funds in the appropriate 
accounts 2 8." An extensive tax review, administration, evaluation, 
and collection system was introduced; a Special Fund was created 
26. Republic of Zambia, Economic Report 1992, op. cit., p. 21. 
27. KASONDE E. G., Budget Address by Minister of Finance to the National 
Assemblvyon 29th Januarv 1993, Lusaka: Government Printer, 1993, p. 9. 
2 8
. ibid, p. 19. 
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for revenues from the privatization of government companies; K2 
billion was earmarked for rehabilitating Zambia's terrible road 
network; tax relief for the handicapped and low-wage earners was 
introduced and along with other tax measures the government 
expected to raise K15 billion in 1993. Proposed expenditure for 
1993 was put at K231.9 billion: K197.1 billion was designated as 
non-drought expenditure, K34.8 billion as drought related. Of the 
K231.9 billion proposed expenditure, K19.8 billion was expected 
from the sale of donated maize and K212.1 billion from other 
domestic sources. Noting that "tax incentives are not the foremost 
considerations among serious investors," the MMD government 
contended that investors would consider "favourable 
macroeconomic policies, political stability, security, the 
availability of resources and markets, and liberal provisions for 
the repatriation of profits." As a measure of the degree of 
openness of the economy and in addition to the "package of tax 
measures" which should "attract investors and stimulate 
investment," the MMD government announced that it "will allow 
the repatriation of 100 percent of after tax profits, with no 
restrictions, and no bureaucratic screening 2 9." This new posture 
in itself generated heated debates on the possible recolonization of 
the Zambian economy. However, except for UNIP members (and 
until the recent emergence of several opposition parties), it was 
not politically wise to oppose the MMD publicly at that time. 
As of the middle of 1995, the government had not 
recorded significant successes in its recovery program. In May 
1995, it faced another severe drought. Like in the 1992 
experience, the government was ready and made plans well 
beyond the traditional reliance on foreign sources to assist 
affected communities. As part of its privatization program, the 
MMD government liquidated Zambia Airways and sent hundreds 
of workers into unemployment thus swelling the ranks of the 
70,000 public employees already retrenched. Twenty more state 
companies are listed for liquidation before the end of 1995. This 
is of course, a very painful choice for a government that derived 
29. ibid. 
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its legitimacy and support from popular constituencies. Yet, the 
size of the civil service needed to be cut, inefficient parastatals like 
the Kabwe Mines needed to be gotten rid of, and there was the 
need to strengthen the productive capacities of Zambians by 
making them rely less on state subsidy. 
Unfortunately, rather than bring Zambians together, the 
privatization program of the government seems to be alienating 
the people, eroding the government's legitimacy, and creating 
pockets of opposition. Those who have been laid off frequently 
blame the government. As well, many workers have not 
benefitted from the privatization program in spite of efforts to 
broaden public participation. The 15 firms sold thus far went to 
"well established businessmen and multinationals who could 
afford to bid for them 3 0." For instance, the 54 million shares sold 
during the privatization of the Chilanga Cement company was 
pegged at K65,000 "minimum investment" and the majority of 
Zambians could not afford such an amount 3 1 . The level of 
indignation had reached worrisome proportions and criticism 
against the government could be heard all over Lusaka and other 
major cities. 
Contrary to its campaign promise, infrastructures are still 
in very bad shape. The MMD government has not been able to 
rehabilitate most roads, public buildings, and services. Though it 
does lack the foreign exchange, the corruption within the 
government makes most Zambians -to believe that "the 
government is just like the previous one. It cares for only the 
rich3 2." Inflation which was at 200 percent in 1991 had practically 
destroyed the social fabric of the nation though it has been 
brought down to 30 percent. This feat, however, is not reflected 
30 . MWIINGA JOWIE. Zambia Economy: Stock Exchange Finds its Feet, Inter 
Press Service, Peace Net, May 10, 1995. 
31. ibid 
32. Interview with MWANSA MARK, Mamba Collieries Guest House, Lusaka, 
June 1993. 
98 
JO.Ihonvbere: The crisis of democratic consolidation in Zambia 
in prices or in the real value of wages and salaries. Though the 
MMD continues to reiterate its full commitment to governmental 
transparency and to structural adjustment, the problem of 
corruption within the government has continued to erode the 
government's credibility and create dangerous political divisions. 
This problem is so endemic that it has divided the party, led to the 
dismissal or resignation of ministers and some founding members 
of the MMD, forced the donor community to withhold foreign 
aid, and tainted the good intentions of the government. Scandals 
in the cabinet, inefficiency, contradictory pronouncements, and 
sycophancy a la Kaunda have come to dominate MMD politics in 
Zambia. Ministers like Roger Chongwe (Legal Affairs) have used 
their positions to illegally acquire acres of land. Ronald Penza, 
Derrick Chitala, and Matthew Ngulube have also "grabbed land" 
illegally33.. The former vice-president, Levi Mwanawasa resigned 
in mid-1994 in the heat of accusations about abuse of office and 
power. Former foreign affairs minister, Vernon Mwaanga who 
had been arrested in 1984 at Frankfurt International Airport on 
drug trafficking charges continued to be accused of running a 
drug ring. His son, Maliko was arrested recently after he was 
found with high grade cocaine worth 70,000 pounds sterling 3 4. 
Sikota Wina, another founding member of the MMD, as well as 
Princess Nakatindi Wina had to resign from the government 
following several accusations of drug trafficking. The list of 
MMD ministers and prominent officials who are well known for 
abuse of office, drug trafficking, corruption, indiscipline, and 
incompetence is quite long. In spite of Chiluba's personal "born 
again" claims, Zambians see him as ineffective and unable to 
control his ministers, who obviously do not share his visions of a 
new Zambia 3 5. These acts of corruption have opened up the MMD 
to very bitter and critical attacks from the opposition parties and 
33. See MWIINGA JOWIE, Zambia-Politics: Land Grabbers on Rampage, 
InterPress Service, Peace Net, May 10, 1995. 
34. MWIINGA JOWIE, Zambia-Politics: Narcotics-Drug War Heals Up, InterPress 
Service, Peace Net, May 18, 1995. 
35. ibid 
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the public; distracted the government from its goals of adjustment 
and openness; and constrained the ability of the government to 
call on Zambians to make sacrifices and accept the pains of 
adjustment. As well, corruption has led to waste, bureaucratic 
inertia, the privatization of public positions, the development of 
unproductive patron-client networks within and outside the 
government, and the erosion of donor and lender support. 
Pervasive corruption has also promoted widespread skepticism, 
even among earlier supporters of the MMD about the MMD's 
ability to sustain democracy and the reform programs. Democracy 
in Zambia has not reduced corruption, if anything, it has made the 
situation worse 3 6. 
Plural democracy in Zambia has not brought ethnic 
groups together. It will be recalled that the "original leadership of 
MMD was dominated by people from one part of the country: 
Lozis from Western Province 3 7." Of course, as the membership 
grew and political elites defected from the UNIP to join the 
MMD, its diversified its ethnic composition. Yet, regions and 
major ethnic groups see the Bembas as dominating the 
government and unduly diverting resources to the North East. 
Loud complaints of marginalization and discrimination are heard 
from the Southern province which had supported the MMD. The 
Eastern province, Kaunda's base has also complained of being 
punished for supporting and remaining loyal to UNIP. UNIP's 
twenty five seats in parliament came from the province. Ethnic 
and regional identities and loyalties have severely divided 
Zambian politicians and politics. Today, none of the political 
parties can strictly be regarded as national in character. The UNIP 
retains its Eastern base. The MMD remains strong in Lulapula and 
the Northern Province. The new party, Zambia Democratic 
Congress (ZADECO) is becoming very popular in the North, and 
the National Party (NP) is strongest in the West. As Elias 
36
. See LORCH DONATELLA, "In Zambia, a Legacy of Graft and a Drug Scandal 
Taint Democratic Reforms," New York Times (January 30, 1994). 
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. KEES VAN DONGE JAN, "Zambia: Kaunda and Chiluba," in WISEMAN JOHN, 
(ed.), Democracy and Political Chan~e in Sub-Saharan Africa, op. cit., p. 199. 
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Nyakutemba has rightly noted, "Flourishing regional politics are 
part of Chiluba's dilemma and he has still put forward no plan for 
regional autonomy despite the overwhelming recommendations of 
the Mwanakatwe constitutional review commission 3 8 ." Left 
unresolved, in the context of failed social and economic 
programs, Zambians will dissolve into their respective ethnic and 
regional enclaves with very far-reaching implications for stability, 
governance, and nation-building. 
The MMD has steadily created a platform for religious 
tensions and conflicts in Zambia. Conflicts between the state and 
religious interests are not necessarily new given the experiences 
with Leshina and Watchtower 3 9. The MMD Manifesto declared 
the country a "Christian country which is tolerant of other 
religions." Though it also declares a commitment to "freedom of 
thought, conscience, belief and proclamation of faith," by placing 
one religion above others which are merely to be "tolerated,"40 the 
party seems to be encouraging religious divisions. Chiluba's born 
again religious positions seems to have emboldened the Christians 
who now openly make disparaging remarks about other religions. 
Not only are television programs dominated by religious 
programs from abroad, but even public functions are full of 
religious activities. Religious sycophancy" has become part of 
Zambian politics as most ministers or politicians, as well as 
contractors have become "bom again" Christians! The regions are 
at war within and between themselves. By refusing to take action 
against corrupt ministers and politicians, by appointing so many 
individuals with records of corruption into his cabinet, and by 
3 8
. NYAKUTEMBE ELIAS, "Zambia: Chiluba's Challenge," New African 
(November 1995). 
3 9
. See ROBERTS A. D. "The Lumpa Church of Alice Leshina," in ROTBERG R. 
and MAZRUI A.A., (eds.), Protest and Power in Black Africa New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970 and LUNGU G.F., "The Church, Labour and the Press in 
Zambia: The Role of Critical Observers in a One-Party State," African Affairs (85) 
(1986). 
40. "Movement for Multi-Party Democracy," Manifesto Lusaka: MMD Campaign 
Committee, n.d, p. 10 . 
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taking very malicious action against those who oppose him, many 
see Chiluba's born again credentials as questionable. More 
importantly, this public perception erodes the credibility of the 
leader, the government, and the party. 
Party indiscipline has also become a major problem. The 
high point of this is evidenced in the conflicts between the central 
MMD government and regional governors who simply refuse to 
toe party lines, take orders from the center, and reconcile 
differences with other levels of authority. In the Northern and 
Northwestern provinces, as well as in the Copperbelt, acts of 
insubordination, disrespect for party rules and decisions, and 
power struggles between MMD stalwarts have at various times 
played into the hands of the opposition and weakened the party. 
While these struggles and conflicts often showed that the MMD 
was yet to see itself as a political party (rather than a movement), 
they have made it possible for alienated party members to transfer 
their support to the opposition. Over 34 opposition parties and 
movements have emerged to challenge the MMD. Many of these 
are led by former leading members, cabinet ministers, and even 
founding members of the MMD. Derrick Chitala former state 
house deputy minister and Dean Mungoba, former deputy 
development minister formed ZADECO after they were dismissed 
by Chiluba. The Caucus for National Unity (CNU) was formed 
by some founding members of the MMD. When Chiluba sacked 
Emmanuel Kasonde, Arthur Wina, and Humphrey Mulemba as 
ministers in April 1993, they formed the NP. They were promptly 
joined by thirteen other parliamentarians like Akashambwata 
Lewanika and his sister, Inonge Lewanika. Though none of the 
opposition parties has the clout and resources as well as 
international visibility of the MMD, their mere existence removes 
a cadre of leaders from the party. Their criticisms erode the 
legitimacy of the party and its leader. They have succeeded in 
recent by-elections in humiliating the MMD, even in its northern 
stronghold. A major coalition of these opposition parties, 
increasing scandals within the government, and deteriorating 
socio-economic conditions could lead to major upsets and a 
drastic reconstruction of political alignments and realignments in 
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Zambia during and after the 1996 elections. For what ever it is 
worth, this possibility has frightened the MMD and forced 
Chiluba to become more intolerant of opposition. 
The re-emergence of Kenneth Kaunda on the Zambian 
political scene, the revitalization of UNIP, and the growing 
influence of some opposition parties, while reflective of the new 
openness and freedoms in Zambia, is also sowing the seeds for 
crisis, instability, even disintegration. Chiluba has reacted to 
Kaunda's growing influence with panic. He has amended the 
constitution to redefine the qualifications for contesting for the 
presidency to include a requirement that both parents must be 
Zambians 4 1 . Clearly aimed at Kenneth Kaunda whose parents 
were Malawians, it has been received with a lot of opposition and 
unfavorable reaction from within and outside Zambia. Kaunda 
fought for Zambia's independence and ruled the country for 27 
years. To now amend the constitution on the eve of the 1996 
elections and only after Kaunda announced his interest in the 
presidency, and in the light of UNIP victories in by-elections in 
Mbala, Mpulungu and Mkushi where MMD candidates were 
defeated, has been seem as nothing short of victimization. To 
further humiliate Kaunda, Chiluba threw open to public view 
Yugoslav-constructed security tunnels under the state house in 
Lusaka. Chiluba argued that the tunnels were used by Kaunda to 
torture political opponents, though he has so far "failed to prove 
that torture did take place...." 4 2 Kaunda argued that the tunnels 
and bunkers "were gifts from friendly nations to "protect 
41. Zambia: Chiluba Defends Requirement for President, London: BBC World 
Service in English, 27 September, 1995. The Government White Paper also 
stipulated that "no person who has been elected president twice should be eligible 
to stand again." See Kaunda, Minister Respond, London: BBC World Service in 
English, 27 September, 1995. Legal Affairs Minister, Remmy Mushota has 
however denied that this was mainly directed at Kaunda. Following statements by 
Home Affairs minister, Chitalu Sampa that Kaunda would be arrested and deported 
to Malawi, the government quickly stepped in to contain a situation which had 
generated tension and led to riots at the University of Zambia when it announced 
that the minister's statement had no official support. 
4 2
. NYAKUTEMBA ELIAS, "Chiluba's Challenge," op. cit. 
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liberation leaders and the presidency from South African 
aggression. " Among those who used the tunnels were Nelson 
Mandela and Sam Nujoma of Namibia 4 3." Rather than attract 
sympathy, Chiluba has been widely criticized for exposing 
Zambian state security to the entire world. As well, he is being 
accused of gross human rights abuses, authoritarianism, 
opportunism, tribalism, and lack of capacity to control his 
ministers. In fact, within the MMD, Chiluba has shown extreme 
hostility and intolerance to those who contemplate, talk less, 
articulate the idea of opposing him as presidential candidate in 
1996. In fact, Dean Mung'omba who announced such an 
intention in early 1995 because "Chiluba's government had failed 
to meet the needs of the poor" and had mismanaged the economic 
reform program while neglecting agriculture and the rural areas, 
was promptly relieved of his position first as deputy finance 
minister, and later as MMD deputy treasurer44. 
Such repressive and intolerant tendencies work directly 
against democratic consolidation. As well, such panicky measures 
simply buy sympathy for the opposition, and has been directly 
responsible for the increasing support which Kaunda is enjoying. 
More importantly, it gives the impression that the government is 
unable to build legitimacy, mobilize the people behind an agenda, 
and that the people can be manipulated and/or convinced to 
support an alternative political platform. This perception is exactly 
what convinced certain elements within UNIP, led by Kaunda's 
son, Wezi Kaunda, to initiate the controversial "Zero Option" in 
1993 as a strategy to oust the Chiluba government from power 
through extra-legal means 4 5 . This episode forced Chiluba to, 
through the MMD-dominated parliament, impose a state of 
emergency, arrest numerous UNIP leaders and activists, and 
43. ibid 
44. Zambian Said Intimidated for Challenging Chiluba," Reuters, 19 May 1995. 
4 5
. For details, see IHONVBERE JULIUS O., "The Zero Option' Controversy in 
Zambia: Western Double Standards vis a vis Safeguarding Security?" Afrika 
Spectrum (30) 1995. 
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charge them to court. This did not go down well with the 
international community, and Zambians who had suffered under 
almost Kaunda's two-decade-plus state of emergency. But it did 
show the fragility of Zambian democracy and the declining 
popularity of the incumbent government46. 
Finally, democratic consolidation is not possible with 
regimes or governments without a strong, reliable, and active 
constituency. Chiluba rode to power on the back of the Zambian 
labor movement which he had led until he was elected president in 
1991. However, the failure of the MMD's reform program and 
the lack of improvement in the lives of non-bourgeois forces, 
have culminated in strikes, riots, and demonstrations by peasants, 
workers, and students. As Nyakutemba rightly notes, the main 
problems of Chiluba "remain poverty, high taxes, soaring 
unemployment and continually falling living standards. There is 
also the failure of medical and educational care and corruption in 
the cabinet 4 7." This is the basis of alienation from the MMD and 
the state, increasing support for the opposition, especially UNIP, 
the NP and ZADECO, and frequent confrontations between the 
state and the forces of civil society. The ZCTU which he headed 
for almost two decades is openly opposed to his structural 
adjustment, especially his privatization program. Teachers have 
organized strikes against the government as have taxi drivers, 
local authority workers, and civil servants. Workers located in 
MMD strongholds in the major cities of Kitwe, Lusaka, Solwezi, 
Kasama, the Copperbelt, and Kabwe have organized strikes 
against the government. Peasants are smuggling their products 
across the border to neighboring countries for better prices. 
Chiluba has relied on the security forces to put down peaceful 
demonstrations and some Zambians have been shot or killed by 
the police. To say the least, Chiluba has lost the support of his 
own constituency and moving the democratic project to the stage 
46
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of consolidation is currently not on the agenda, it will take rather 
enormous efforts to sustain the liberal content and context of 
current initiatives in the country: "Chiluba will be hard put to 
convince voters that he can deliver the fruits of democracy in his 
second term of office, as he failed in the first48." 
Conclusion 
The Zambian case demonstrates the limitations of liberal 
democracy in economies in deep crisis. Democracy has not 
reduced corruption and the abuse of office. True, it has opened up 
the political landscape, but it has not wiped out human rights 
abuses, reduced primordial conflicts, promoted accountability, or 
reduced poverty in any way. In fact, in spite of pluralism, 
unemployment, poverty, crime, prostitution, violence, and 
general social decay have increased. As well, in spite of the initial 
enthusiasm about Zambian democracy and promises of foreign 
aid, these have not materialized and investors are not rushing to 
invest in the country especially as its socio-economic crisis 
continue to deepen. The MMD is certainly a conservative political 
movement which is committed to orthodox adjustment programs. 
Yet, the failure of the same adjustment program had delegitimized 
the Kaunda government and culminated in its massive defeat in 
the 1991 election. How the MMD hopes to carry on with the 
policy, without guaranteed foreign support, diversification of its 
economy, better copper prices, and some appreciable degree of 
debt-relief is a challenge. 
In terms of power relations, regional conflicts, 
primordial considerations, and accountability, the MMD has not 
differentiated itself from the previous Kaunda government in a 
substantial way. In several respects, it is much worse than the 
Kaunda government. This is largely because virtually all the 
leaders and initial ministers of the MMD were former Kaunda 
ministers who had been sacked for corruption, incompetence, and 
48. i b i d . 
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abuse of office. They had joined in setting up the MMD to 
challenge Kaunda not because they believed in democracy, but 
because they wanted to re-enter Zambian politics and have direct 
access to the state and its resources. The lack of democracy in the 
numerous opposition parties and their weak and confused 
programs and patterns of politics, reveals much about the caliber 
of the founders and ministers who had run the MMD. What 
lessons do we draw from the Zambian experience therefore? 
The first lesson is that democratization or at least a 
transition to democracy is possible without the prerequisites 
established in the literature: economic development, a large urban-
based working class, a productive bourgeois class, a culture of 
conflict resolution and negotiations between elites, and a 
conducive international environment 4 9 . In reality, those 
prerequisites are the goals for which people struggle and might as 
well be treated as the outcomes of democracy as Terry Lynn Karl 
has also argued 5 0. Second, there is a need to be more nuanced 
about the nature, politics, composition, and goals of the 
prodemocracy movements and new political parties in Africa. 
Many are more conservative than incumbent regimes. They are 
also dominated by disgraced, corrupt, opportunistic, and 
"emergency" or "born again democrats. Women as still 
marginalized, they remain urban-based, excessively personalize 
their politics, and seek legitimization of the political credentials 
from outside interests rather than from local communities and 
constituencies. Such politicians and movements are likely to be 
obstacles to democratic consolidation. In Zambia, the likes of 
49. For a discussion see ALMOND G.A., The Civic Culture, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963; HUNTINGTON SAMUEL , The Third Wave, op. cit, 
LIPSET S.M., "Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development 
and Political Legitimacy, " American Political Science Review Vol. 53, (1), 
1976; and MOORE BARRINGTON, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy; London: Allen Lane, 1967) 
KARL TERRY LYNN, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," 
Comparative Politics (2), October 1990, pp. 1-21. See also LEMARCHAND 
RENE, "African Transitions to Democracy: An Interim (and Mostly Pessimistic) 
Assessment," Africa Insight Vol. 22, (3),1992, pp. 178-185. 
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Vernon Mwaanga have done so much damage to the process of 
democratic consolidation, and have created serious doubts in the 
minds of the people about the sincerity of the prodemocracy 
movements, third wave political parties, and their leaders. Third, 
in an economy in deep crisis like Zambia, even good intentions 
and donor support might not be enough to sustain democracy. It 
would require very drastic structural transformations for foreign 
aid to make any impact. Chiluba did not alter the structure and 
nature of public institutions. Many of the symbols, institutions, 
and legacies of the previous regimes were retained. These have 
worked steadily to contain the enthusiasm for multiparty 
democracy, subverted reform programs, and provided platforms 
for the opposition to regroup to challenge the government. 
Fourth, the masses of the people have a very limited elasticity of 
pain. Just emerging from authoritarian repression and 
manipulation, and haven been fed on promises of a better future, 
they expect immediate results. It means that third wave parties and 
popular movements must do their research, articulate a viable 
platform, understand the terrain of politics, and tell the truth to the 
electorate. The excuse of the devastation precipitated by previous 
governments can only be used, at the maximum, for one year. 
When the people fail to see results, and when, as in the case of 
Zambia, they see increasing corruption and mismanagement, they 
transfer their loyalties to other constituencies and the opposition. 
Fifth, continuing ethnic, regional, and religious divisions remain 
a challenge to democracy and development. So far, the new 
movements have focused on the failings of incumbent regimes in 
economic matters. There is need to map out a clear agenda for 
containing divisions along primordial lines as well as issues of 
gender equality, environmental protection, and human rights. The 
MMD does not have such a program. Denying the existence of 
nepotism and ethnic manipulation does not resolve the problem. 
Zambians generally think that the MMD is Bemba-dominated. So 
far, the government has not developed a viable agenda for 
transcending the negative impact and implications of ethnic 
loyalty. Sixth, we see from Zambia, the fact that democracy does 
not bring development, at least, the connection is not automatic. 
The possibilities are there but the contradictions and constraints 
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are equally legion. Commitment to an orthodox adjustment 
program which continues to victimize the already vulnerable 
majority without safety nets, will mediate rather than promote 
democracy. Unless the transition process involves the generation 
of new ideas, alternative pro-people reform programs, 
mobilization of people across ethnic and other lines, and the 
promotion of a new work culture, accountabil i ty, 
accommodation, and a new commitment to productivity, liberal 
democracy will make little or no difference. Finally, and this is 
probably the most important issue: It is doubtful if a new 
democratic government can use the same state structure which had 
been employed by an earlier government to intimidate, exploit, 
and repress the people for genuinely alternative programs. The 
MMD has not tried to dismantle and restructure the repressive 
Zambian state. Rather, it has tried to accommodate the same 
elites, institutions, constituencies, and interests which aided 
Kaunda in running down the economy and squandering 
possibilities for growth, development, and democracy. 
Democracy, in this context, will end up, like Mike Mpokoda, a 
laid off worker at Kabwe Mines put it, "like a trick5 1." 
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